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*
In the last decades, the protection of animals has become a
pervasive goal of federal statutory law. Indeed, Congress has enacted
more than fifty statutes designed to protect the well-being of
animals.
1
Of these the most prominent is the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA),
2 which contains a wide range of safeguards against cruelty
and mistreatment, and which creates an incipient bill of rights for
animals.
3 If vigorously enforced, the AWA, alongside other
enactments, would prevent a wide range of abusive practices. As
often, however, there is a large gap between statutory text and real-
world implementation. Many people have criticized the national
government’s enforcement efforts under these statutes, contending
that the executive branch has violated the law by issuing weak and
inadequate regulations, making the relevant statutes symbolic rather
than real.
4 These complaints raise a central and largely unexplored
question,
5 one that will inevitably increase in prominence over time:
Under what circumstances will standing be available for those,
                                                
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Brooke May for
superb research assistance, to Jill Hasday and Adrian Vermeule for valuable
comments, and to Martha Nussbaum for helpful discussions.
1 For an already dated overview, see Henry Cohen, Federal Animal Protection
Statutes, 1 Animal Law 143 (1995). Of course human beings are animals too, and
there is an oddity, and perhaps a pernicious one, in the linguistic convention of
distinguishing between human beings and animals. See James Rachels, Created
From Animals (1990). For simplicity I use the convention at several points here.
2 7 USC 2131 et seq,
3 See 7 USC 2131 et seq. I use the word “incipient” because many qualifications
are necessary to the view that the AWA creates a genuine animals’ bill of rights.
See Gary Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law 185-248 (1995), for an
extended and highly critical discussion.
4 See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (DC Cir 1994);
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (DC Cir 1998).
5 Valuable discussion can be found in Francione, supra note, at 65-89.Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 2
human and non-human, who seek to challenge unlawful
mistreatment of animals?
6
Current doctrine is exceptionally confusing on this question.
7
One of my chief goals here is to dispel some of the confusion, in a
way that, I hope, will illuminate the law of standing and the question
of “animal rights” as a whole. My principal conclusion is that human
beings, invoking their own injuries as a predicate for the action, are
entitled to sue to protect the interests of animals in a variety of
settings. More particularly, three categories of persons—those
deprived of legally required information, those facing “aesthetic”
injury, and those suffering competitively—have standing to protect
the legal interests of animals.
This conclusion is part of a more general one: the question of
standing is mostly for legislative resolution, and both people and
animals have standing to protect animals to the extent that Congress
has said that they have standing. Under existing law, this means (in
my view unfortunately) that animals lack standing to sue in their
own right, for Congress has restricted standing to “persons.” But it
also means that Congress can accord standing to animals if it
chooses to do so.
As we will see, these conclusions about animal and human
standing raise a number of questions about existing law and suggests
some promising directions for rethinking it, not only in the context
of standing to protect animals but more generally. In the process of
discussing the standing question, I also offer a few notes on the
much-debated topic of animal rights.
8 My plea here is for
disaggregation. From the legal point of view, there is nothing at all
                                                
6 A famous article urged that standing should be accorded to non-human objects.
See Christopher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev. 450
(1972). The principal difference between that article and this one has to do with
the conception of the law of standing. In my view, the standing question is for
legislative resolution. The claim that people have standing to protect the rights of
animals, and that animals may be given standing to have suit brought on their
behalf in their own name, is a claim about the nature of legislative power.
7 See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman, 154 F.2 426 (DC Cir. 1998)
(7-4 division on en banc court); Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
Society, 478 US 221 (1986).
8 See Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (1976); Gary Francione, Animals, Property,
and the Law (1995).3 Standing for Animals
new or unfamiliar in the idea of “animal rights”; on the contrary, it is
entirely clear that animals have legal rights, at least of a certain kind.
9
An investigation of the question of standing helps show that the real
issues involve problems of enforcement and scope. Much
illumination can be gained by dividing the question of “animal
rights” into its component parts. For those who believe (as I do) that
any general attack on the notion of “animal rights” is implausible,
10
and who notice that a growing commitment to animal welfare is an
unmistakable part of modern public law, the strategy of
disaggregation seems best suited toward producing both analytical
clarity and future progress. To this end I offer a recommendation
that is modest but that would do considerable good; animal welfare
statutes should be amended to grant a private cause of action against
those who violate them, so as to allow private claimants to
supplement agency enforcement efforts.
I. Animal Rights in Action
Without much fanfare or advance foresight, American law has
come to recognize a wide array of protections for animals.
11 Indeed,
it would not be too much to say that federal and state law now
guarantee a set of “animal rights.”
12 Some people believe that while
                                                
9 Thus there is disagreement here with the sharp distinction drawn in Gary
Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (1998), between “animal rights” and
“animal welfare.” Statutes protecting animal welfare protect a form of animal
rights, and there is nothing in the notion of “rights” or “welfare” that calls for
much, or little, protection of the relevant interests. Rights can be defeasible, and
an interest in “welfare” may create a strong presumption. Francione convincingly
shows, however, that the interests of animals are given remarkably and
indefensibly little weight under many state and federal laws.
10 See James Rachels, Created From Animals:The Moral Implications of
Darwinism (1990), for general discussion.
11 Remarkably little academic attention has been given to this development.
Relevant discussion can be found in Dichter, Legal Definitions of Cruelty and
Animal Rights, 7 BC Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 147 (1978); Susan Godkin, The
Evolution of Animal Rights, 18 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 259 (1987).
12 American law thus rejects Kant’s view that animals are mere things and that any
duties owed to them really involve duties owed to people. “But so far as animals
are concerned we have no direct duties. Animals . . . are there merely as means to
an end. That end is man.” The reason to avoid cruelty to animals is that “He whoChicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 4
animals lack rights, human beings have duties to them.
13 It is not
clear what turns on this distinction, a point to which I will return.
But it is clear that as a matter of positive law, animals have rights in
the same sense that people have rights, at least under those statutes
that are enforceable only by public officials.
14
A. State Law: Cruelty, Expansively Construed
The common law contained a good deal of uncertainty about
cruelty to animals. Courts generally suggested that such cruelty was
not unlawful unless it worked an injury to the owner, who was the
                                                                                                              
is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with man.” Immanuel Kant,
Lectures on Ethics 239-40.
13 Thus Kant believed that “indirect duties” were due to animals only for the sake
of human beings; see id. See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 512 (1971),
suggesting, in a qualified way, that animals are not due justice but are due
consideration: “While I have no maintained that the capacity for a sense of justice
is necessary in order to be owed the duties of justice, it does seem that we are not
required to give strict justice anyway to creatures lacking this capacity. But it does
not follow that there are no requirements at all in regard to them . . . Certainly it is
wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of a whole species can be a great
evil. The capacity for feelings for pleasure and pain and for the forms of life of
which animals are capable clearly impose duties of compassion and humanity in
their case. I shall not attempt to explain these considered beliefs. They are outside
the scope of the theory of justice . . . .” This is a brief passage, almost an aside, and
it is not clear what Rawls means by “strict justice.” An obvious problem is why
“the” theory of justice should find the question of fairness to animals outside of its
scope. See also the emphasis on “moral persons,” with among other things an
ability to have a sense of justice, as those to whom “equal justice” is owed, id. at
505, a suggestion that raises obvious problems for, eg, the mentally retarded. My
suspicion, though I cannot establish the point here, is that the evident problems
with entirely excluding animals from the topic of justice raises difficulties for
contractarian theories in general.
14 This is true, for example, of many criminal and regulatory statutes that do not
create private rights of action. Of course the words “at least” are important; duties
created by the criminal law are generally accompanied by parallel common law
rights, so that people ordinarily have rights to protect themselves in the event that
the prosecutor fails to act. But this is not always the case; under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, to take one of many examples, there is no private right o action.
It is important here to avoid purely semantic disagreements; the only point is that
animals have rights in the same sense that people have many rights that they
cannot enforce on their own.5 Standing for Animals
essential rights holder
15; but they sometimes concluded that cruelty
could count as a common law misdemeanor.
16 The common law has
of course been superseded by state statutes, and every state now
purports to provide significant safeguards against cruelty or
mistreatment of animals. Hence it is now said, in many jurisdictions,
that “animals have rights, which, like those of human beings, are to
be protected.”
17 The relevant provisions are broadly phrased and
seem to offer significant safeguards; but in practice, enforcement
activity is sporadic and unreliable.
18
What is perhaps most striking is that the relevant statutes go
well beyond beating, injuring, and the like, and impose affirmative
duties on people with animals in their care. Omissions may count as
cruelty; so too for overworking or underfeeding animals, or for
depriving them of adequate protection.
19 Owners must offer
adequate sustenance and shelter.
20 As a matter of statutory text,
defenses and excuses are quite limited. Protection of life or property
is a defense against a charge of unlawful killing of an animal, but
there must be a reasonable proportion between the danger presented
and the action taken
21; and anger, intoxication, and impulse provide
neither defense nor excuse.
22
New York contains a representative set of provisions. Anyone
who has impounded or confined an animal is obliged to provide
good air, water, shelter, and food.
23 Criminal penalties are imposed
on anyone who transports an animal in a cruel or inhuman manner,
                                                
15 Allen v. Commonwealth, 77 Pa. Super. 244 (1921); McCausland v. People, 145
P 685 (1914); Waters v. People, 46 P 112 (1896).
16 Stage Horse Cases, 15 Abb Pr. N.S. 51; Ross’s Case, 3 City Hall Rec. 191.
17 State v. Karstendiek, 22 So 845 (1897); Hodge v. State,79 Tenn. 528 (1883).
18 See Francione, supra, at 119-133.
19 See 3A Corpus Juris Secondum 101, p. 586.
20 State v, Gorsoeclose, 171 P2d 863, 67 Idaho 71(1946); Ames v. Ohio, 11 Ohio
NPNS 385; State v. Goodall, 175 P 857; 90 Or. 485.
21 See Grizzle v. State, 707 P2d 1210 (1985); Rushin v., State, 267 SE2d 473 (Ct.
App. Ga. 1980); State v. Libby, 556 A.2d 1099 (1989). On the relation between
statutes preventing cruelty to animals and medical or scientific experimentation,
see 42 ALR4th 860.
22 3A Corpus Juris Secundum 106, pp. 590-91.
23 NY Agri & Mkts 356.Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 6
or in such a way as to subject it to torture or suffering, conditions
that can come about through neglect.
24 People who transport an
animal on railroads or cars are required to allow the animal out for
rest, feeding, and water every five hours.
25 Those who abandon an
animal, including a pet, face criminal penalties.
26 A separate
provision forbids people from torturing, beating, maiming, or killing
any animal, and also requires people to provide adequate food and
drink.
27 Indeed it is generally a crime not to provide necessary
sustenance, food, water, shelter, and protection from severe
weather.
28 New York, like most states, forbids overworking an
animal, or using it for work when it is not physically fit.
29 Compare
in this regard the unusually protective California statute, which
imposes criminal liability on negligent as well as intentional
overworking, overdriving, or torturing of animals.
30 “Torture” is
defined not in its ordinary language sense, but to include any act or
omission “whereby unnecessary or unjustified physical pain or
suffering is caused or permitted.”
31
There are three noteworthy points about state prohibitions on
cruelty to animals. First, enforcement can occur only through public
prosecution; the state has a monopoly on implementation.
32 The
point is important because prosecution occurs only in a subset of the
most egregious cases; there is a great deal of difference between what
these statutes ban and what in practice is permitted to occur.
33
                                                
24 NY Agri & Mkts 379a.
25 NY Agri & Mkts 359.
26 NY Agri & Mkts 355.
27 NY Agri & Mkts 353.
28 See Griffth v. State, 43 SE 251 (1903); Commonwealth v. Lufkin, 7 Allen 579;
State v. Groseclose, 171 P2d 863 (1946); Reynolds v. State, 569 NE2d 680
(1991).
29 See Commonwealth v. Wood, 111 Mass 408 (1873); State v. Goodall, 175 P
857; State v. Prince, 94 A 966.
30 Cal. Penal Code 597b.
31 Cal Penal Code 599b.
32 The only exception is that animal owners also have actions in property or tort to
recover the monetary equivalent of damage done to all objects within their
possession, including animals.
33 See Francione, supra note.7 Standing for Animals
Private enforcement would obviously make a great deal of
difference.
34 Second, duties to animals, and the correlative rights of
animals, exist largely by virtue of a particular relationship voluntarily
assumed by human beings—that of owner, transporter, driver, and
so forth. There are no obligations of good samaritanship, for
example, or of affirmative obligations to animals not within one’s
domain or care. In these ways the network of duties to animals tracks
the corresponding network for duties to human beings, many of
which are enforced publicly rather than privately, and which
generally do not include obligations of good samaritanship. Third,
state law protections do not apply to the use of animals for medical
or scientific purposes, or for use as food, or for cruelty in connection
with the production of animals as food; here cruel and abusive
practices are generally unregulated at the state level.
35
It would be an overstatement to say that the relevant provisions
are entirely symbolic. But because they are vulnerable to
prosecutorial decisions, and because few prosecutors have them a
high priority, they have a largely expressive dimension. They say
much more than they do. They express an aspiration, but one that is
routinely violated in practice, and violated without reprisal.
B. Federal Law: Species, Mammals, Horses, Others
In the last several decades, a remarkable number of federal
statutes have been enacted to protect species, animals, and animal
welfare. Over fifty such statutes are now in place, and the number is
growing.
36 The most famous of these statutes is the Endangered
Species Act,
37 designed to protect against extinction of threatened or
endangered species, enforced publicly rather than privately, and
raising a number of knotty standing problems.
38 A great deal of
                                                
34 This is an evident motivation for the recommendation in Steven M. Wise,
Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and
Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of A Companion Animal, 4
Animal Law 33 (1998).
35 See Francione, supra note.
36 See Cohen, supra note.
37 16 USC 1531
38 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992).Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 8
litigation has involved the meaning of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act,
39 which imposes a selective moratorium on the
taking and importation of marine mammals and marine mammal
products.
40 A particular provision outlaws commercial whaling.
41 It
also requires the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations to
protect marine mammals from unlawful activity.
42
Federal law contains a number of more specialized provisions.
An important statute is specifically designed to protect horses from
cruel treatment and in particular from the exploitation of injured
horses.
43 The key statute involving game parks provides, “no person
shall kill any game in said park except under an order from the
Secretary of the Interior for the protection of persons or to protect or
prevent the extermination of other animals or birds."
44 Another
statute is designed to protect migratory bird habitat and also to
protect habitat for mammals, including bears, moose, and wolves.
45
Federal law imposes a moratorium on the importation of raw and
worked ivory, as a way of helping to protect the African elephant.
46
It is a federal crime to shoot birds, fish, or mammals from an
aircraft, or to use an aircraft to harass birds, fish, or animals.
47 It is
also a federal crime to kill or harass wild horses or burros
48 and to
possess, sell, buy, or transport any bald or golden eagle, alive or
dead.
49 The Secretary of Agriculture is charged with ensuring that
slaughtering of animals must be “humane,” and Congress lists two
methods that are designed to ensure “rapid and effective” killing.
50
                                                
39 16 USC 1372(a)(2)(A).
40 16 USC 1371 et seq,
41 16 USC 1372(f).
42 16 USC 1373
43 15 USC 1822. See Thornton v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, C.A.11 1983,
44 16 U.S.C.A. 352
45 16 USC 676.
46 16 USC 4201 et seq.
47 18 USC 742j-1.
48 16 USC 1331 et seq.
49 16 USC 668 et seq.
50 7 USC 1901 et seq.9 Standing for Animals
C. A Federal Bill of Rights for Animals (?)
In terms of animal protection, however, by far the most
important measure is the Animal Welfare Act, which imposes, on
those who deal in or with animals, a wide range of negative
constraints and affirmative duties.
51 The Act begins with an
elaborate statement of purposes, emphasizing the need for “humane
care and treatment” in exhibition of animals, transportation of
animals, and “use” of animals “as pets.”
52 There is a flat ban on
commercial ventures in which animals are supposed to fight.
53
Licenses are required for all those who sell animals for exhibition or
for “use” as a pet.
54 The Secretary is also asked to issue “humane
standards” with respect to “the purchase, handling, or sale of
animals” by “dealers, research facilities, and exhibitors at auction
sales.”
55
The key provision of the statute requires the Secretary to issue
“standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment, and
transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities, and
exhibitors.”
56 These are supposed to include “minimum
requirements” governing “handling, housing, feeding, watering,
sanitation, ventilation, shelter from extremes of weather and
temperatures, adequate veterinary care.”
57 A separate provision
requires minimum requirements for “exercise of dogs”
58 and “for a
physical environment adequate to promote the psychological well-
being of primates.”
59 Animals in research facilities must be protected
in addition through requirements “to ensure that animal pain and
distress are minimized.”
60 In “any practice which could cause pain to
                                                
51 7 USC 2131 et seq,
52 Id. at 2131.
53 7 USC 2156.
54 7 USC 2134.
55 7 USC 2142,
56 7 USC 2143.
57 7 USC 2143(a)(2)(A).
58 See Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Secretary of Agriculture, 813 F Supp 882
(DDCC 1993), vacated, 29 F.3d 720 (DC Cir 1993).
59 7 USC 2143(a)(2)(B).
60 Lesser v Espy, 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994).Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 10
animals,” a veterinarian must be consulted in planning, and
tranquilizers, analgesics, and anesthetics must be used.
61 An
independent provision requires compliance by the national
government with the Secretary’s standards.
62 Breeders of dogs and
cats must allow inspections and may not transport underage dogs.
63
The Act also contains a set of recordkeeping requirements, designed
to ensure that dealers, exhibitors, research facilities, and handlers
provide records, evidently designed to allow federal monitoring of
the treatment of animals.
64
Most state statutes do some of the work of the Animal Welfare
Act by forbidding cruelty and requiring adequate nutrition and
shelter. But the Act goes beyond state law by imposing a federal
presence and also by imposing numerous requirements not contained
in state law. These include requirements of exercise for dogs,
minimizing pain and distress to animals used in research, adequate
veterinary care in general, recordkeeping, and a physical environment
that will promote the psychological well-being of primates.
By virtue of its scope, the Animal Welfare Act promises an
ambitious set of safeguards against cruel or injurious practices; taken
together with other federal statutes, above all the Marine Mammal
Protection Act, it suggests that national law is committed to
something not very different from a bill of rights for animals.
65 But
here too there is a question whether statutory law is not largely
expressive and symbolic, a statement of good intentions, delivering
far more on paper than in the world.
66 Many people have
complained that these statutes have been indifferently or even
unlawfully enforced, not least via regulations that do far less than the
statute requires.
67 The Departure of Agriculture has hardly been
eager to enforce the AWA, and neither citizens nor animals have
                                                
61 7 USC 2143(a)(3)(C)(i); 7 USC 2143(a)(3)(C)(ii)
62 7 USC 2143.
63 Cox v. US Dept of Agriculture, 925 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1991).
64 7 USC 2140; 7 USC 2142.
65 A notable exception involves animals raised for use as food or clothing.
66 See Francione, supra, at 185-248.
67 See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Espy,23 F.3d 496 (DC Cir 1994);
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (DC Cir 1998).11 Standing for Animals
been given an express cause of action against facilities that are in
violation.
68 An important question therefore becomes: Who has
standing to bring suit to require compliance with law governing
animal welfare?
II. Standing:
Human Beings, Human Rights, and Animal Welfare
Under current doctrine, Article III is understood to require
plaintiffs to show: (1) an injury in fact that (2) is a result of the
action of the defendant and that (3) would be redressed by a decree
on the plaintiff’s behalf.
69 There are also “prudential” requirements,
that is, standing rules that can be eliminated if Congress does so
expressly. The most important of these require (1) that the injury be
“arguably within the zone of interests” protected or regulated by the
statute in action
70 and (2) that the injury not be widely generalized,
that is, it must not be shared by all or most citizens.
71 Under what
circumstances do these requirements permit or bar an action brought
to prevent unlawful injury done to an animal? The most general
question is when human beings may invoke their own “injuries in
fact” to challenge harms done to animals. I suggest here that three
kinds of injuries are relevant: deprivation of information, competitive
injury, and aesthetic harm. My major interest here is in unpacking
the implications of current standing doctrine in this unusual context;
I deal below with further complexities.
                                                
68 See IPPL v. IBR, 799 F.2d 934 (4th Cir 1986).
69 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555 (1992); FEC v. Akins,
118 S Ct 1777 (1998).
70 See Clarke v. SIA, 479 US 388 (1987); Data Processing v. Camp, 397 US 150
(1970); National Credit Union Admin. v. First National Bank 118 S Ct 927
(1998).
71 See FEC v. Akins, 118 S Ct 1777 (1998). There the Court held that Congress
could give standing to “any person” to require disclosure of information about an
alleged “political committee.”Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 12
A. Existing Law: Informational Standing
It is now established that Congress can confer on citizens—even
on citizens as a whole—a right to obtain information.
72 It is also
established that Congress can give citizens—even all citizens—a
right to bring suit to vindicate that interest.
73 If Congress says that
people have a right to information of a certain kind, and if that
information is denied, Congress is permitted to say that the
deprivation of information counts as an “injury in fact” for which suit
may be brought.
These points suggest the first route by which people might have
standing to protect the rights of animals. Suppose, for example, that
a statute obliges laboratories and zoos to provide to the government,
or even the public at large, information about their treatment of
animals within their care. Suppose that it is urged that under the
government’s legally insufficient regulations, far less information is
forthcoming than would be available under a legally sufficient
regulation. If Congress has granted standing to “any person” to
contest violations of this duty of disclosure, there should be no
constitutional obstacle to the suit; The deprivation of the requisite
information counts as the “injury in fact.”
The “if” in the preceding sentence is an extremely important
qualification, for Congress has not given citizens standing to seek
information that bears on animal welfare.
74 Neither the Animal
Welfare Act nor the Marine Mammal Protection Act contains any
such grant. When Congress has not spoken clearly, plaintiffs must
therefore rely on the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires
them to show as well (a) that their injury is arguably within the zone
of interests protected or regulated by the statute and (b) that their
injury is not too “widely generalized.” Thus, for example, if a citizen
is unable to distinguish himself from any other citizen complains of
                                                
72 See FEC v. Akins, 118 S Ct 1777 (1998). For general discussion, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Informational Standing and Informational Regulation: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U Pa L Rev 613 (1999).
73 Id.
74 The only exception is the Endangered Species Act, which does give standing to
“any person,” but not to receive information. Of course the opportunity to see a
member of an endangered species may provide information, but that is a different
matter. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, supra.13 Standing for Animals
unlawful deprivation of information involving treatment of animals,
his injury will probably be held too widely generalized to be
cognizable.
75 And in some cases, the plaintiffs’ interests might be
deemed too far afield of the interests protected or regulated by the
statute.
Consider in the latter regard Animal Legal Defense Fund v.
Espy.
76 There the Animal Legal Defense Fund and the Humane
Society of the United States challenged what they saw as an unduly
narrow definition of “animal” for purposes of the Animal Welfare
Act, a definition that would exclude birds, rats, and mice from the
category “animal.” The plaintiffs claimed injury from the fact that
the narrow definition of animal, which would undermine “their
attempts to gather and disseminate information on laboratory
conditions for those animals.”
77 With a broader definition,
laboratories would be required to provide more information about
their treatment of animals, and the plaintiffs contended that they
would use that information in “public education and rulemaking
proceedings.”
78 The narrow definition of “animal” would also make it
harder for plaintiffs to educate the laboratories about the “humane
treatment of birds, rats, and mice.”
79
It is clear that the plaintiffs would have had standing if
Congress had expressly said that they have standing. But under the
APA, the court held otherwise. Its central claim was that the
informational injury did not fall within the zone of interests of the
statute. The Animal Defense Fund was not attempting to protect its
members’ own legal rights, but “simply to educate all those who
desire to promote the statute’s substantive purpose.”
80 Informational
standing would require not merely a “general corporate purpose to
promote the interests to which the statute is addressed” but also “a
congressional intent to benefit the organization” or some evidence
that the organization is “a peculiarly suitable challenger of
                                                
75 See Akins, 118 S Ct at 1791.
76 23 F.3d 496 (DC Cir 1994).
77 23 F.3d at 501.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 23 F.3d at 503.Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 14
administrative neglect.”
81 In this regard the court emphasized that
the Animal Welfare Act creates an oversight committee consisting
of private citizens designed to ensure compliance with the Act. Thus
“the organizations are not the intended representatives of the public
interest in animal welfare.”
82
The general approach suggested in Espy is quite sound;
sometimes those who invoke rights under a statute protected animal
welfare will not be within the statutory zone of interests. But the
particular holding is quite doubtful. As the Supreme Court has made
clear, the zone of interests test is not meant to be demanding,
83 and
if any group is within the zone of interests of the Act, members of
the Animal Legal Defense Fund count as such. The strongest
argument for the court’s conclusion would be that the existence of
the oversight committee should be taken to negate standing for other
private organizations concerned about inadequate enforcement.
84 But
this is a fragile argument. It would be at least as plausible to say that
private lawsuits do not displace but complement the work of the
oversight committee. For present purposes what matters is less the
particular evaluation than the general suggestion that for actions
brought under the APA, those who complain of a deprivation of
information may suffer injury in fact but fall outside the zone of
statutorily protected interests.
B. Existing Law: Competitive Injuries
 It has become a platitude to suggest that many apparently
public-spirited statutes are enacted, or take the form they do,
because of the competitive benefits they provide to individuals or
companies with self-interested states in the outcome.
85 If
                                                
81 23 F.3d at 503, quoting Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 274 U.S.
App. D.C. 44, 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106,
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government enforces such statutes inadequately, competitors might
be injured “in fact.” The Supreme Court has been quite willing to
allow competitors to challenge unlawful governmental action adverse
to their interests.
86 For example, the Court has allowed a set of
individual banks, and also the American Bankers Association, to
challenge agency action allowing credit unions to create multiple
unrelated employer groups, an action that, in the banks’ view, would
give credit unions an unlawful competitive advantage.
87
This line of cases raises legitimate (though not yet explored
88)
possibilities for human standing to protect animal welfare. Suppose,
for example, that the statute at issue places certain companies at a
competitive disadvantage, by forbidding those companies from
engaging in practices that would help them in the marketplace. The
proposed ban on the importation of products made with dog or cat
fur is an example; the ban would plainly help companies that sell
ordinary or synthetic fur coats. The existing cases on competitor
standing suggest that such companies would be entitled to sue to
create legally required enforcement action. Or suppose that a statute
designed to protect animal welfare is obeyed by some commercial
actors but not by others; suppose too that compliance is costly and
hence that those who disobey are at a competitive advantage (as is
highly likely). At first glance, a company that complies with the
Animal Welfare Act (in testing pain-relief products, for example)
would seem to have standing to challenge governmental practices
that allow its competitors to do whatever they wish.
 There are two obstacles to competitor standing in this context.
First, the competitor must be arguably within the zone of interests
protected by the statute, and in some cases, it is easy to imagine an
argument that the competitor’s interests are simply too far afield.
89
Whether the argument is convincing depends on the particular
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statute and on whether its background reveals a lack of concern with
the plaintiff’s interests. The cases suggest that courts are quite
willing to presume that statutes do show such an interest and hence
that competitor standing is highly likely.
90 Second, a competitor
might have problems along the dimension of redressability. If, for
example, a statute is applied to forbid the importation of coats lined
with cat fur, how, exactly, will any particular competitor be helped?
The cases suggest that competitor standing will be presumed in cases
of this kind,
91 but the issue raises a number of complexities. I return
to this point below.
C. Existing Law: Aesthetic Injuries
In many cases, a plaintiff objecting to harm done to an animal
seeks to claim an “aesthetic injury.” In a number of these cases,
standing is available. But there is considerable conflict in the lower
courts, and the outcomes seems quite unruly and even odd. Let us
begin with some polar cases.
1. No injuries and no plans. Suppose that a citizen, activist, or
researcher objects to the unlawful and inhumane treatment of
animals in a certain facility; the facility may be a zoo, or it may be a
laboratory engaged in experimentation. Suppose that the citizen,
activist, or researcher attempts to bring suit. On the facts as stated,
the outcome is clear: Standing is unavailable, for there is no injury in
fact. The plaintiffs have only an ideological interest in the dispute,
and they are attempting to enforce the law for its own sake. Under
current law, there is universal agreement on this point.
92 The key
holding is Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, where the plaintiffs,
including people interested in seeing and studying members of an
endangered species, challenged a federal decision not to apply the
Endangered Species Act extraterritorially. The Court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing because they had no plan to visit the
members of the species; whether they had a concrete interest of this
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kind was, on a reasonable reading of the complaint, purely
speculative. Thus they failed to show an injury in fact. Along the
same lines, consider Animal Lovers Volunteer Association v.
Weinberger,
93 in which the plaintiffs sought to enjoin aerial shooting
of goats on a military enclave for which public access is unavailable.
The court held that standing was unavailable because the members
did not visit the enclave and hence lacked any concrete injury.
2. Plans, scientists, visitors. Now assume that certain scientists
and researchers are attempting to see and study members of a
particular species; that their desire to see and study the relevant
animals is imminent and definite rather than conjectural; and that
they challenge government action that, on their view, will reduce the
supply of animals available for study. Under current law, it appears
clear that the scientists and researchers have standing.
94 In Defenders
of Wildlife, the Court acknowledged as much, suggesting that if the
plaintiffs had procured a plane ticket, the injury in fact requirement
would be met.
95 The injury in fact consists of the reduced likelihood
that they will be able to engage in the relevant research.
As we will see, questions might be raised about this analysis; but
the law appears settled on the point. The key case is Japan Whaling
Assn. v. American Cetacean Soc.
96 There several wildlife conservation
groups, including members who were committed to watching and
studying whales, objected to the failure of the Secretary of
Commerce to certify that nationals in Japan were engaged in acts
diminishing the effectiveness of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling. The consequence of certification of Japan by
the Secretary of Commerce would be to require the Secretary of
State to reduce, by at least 50%, Japan’s fishing allocation within the
United States.
97 In a brief discussion in a footnote, the Court held
that the wildlife organizations had standing. “They undoubtedly
have alleged a sufficient ‘injury in fact’ in that the whale watching
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and studying of their members will be adversely affected by
continued whale harvesting.”
98 Indeed, the same conclusion applies
not only to scientists and researchers, but also to everyone with an
interest in observing members of the relevant species, even if the
interest is “for purely esthetic purposes.”
99 Thus in Animal Welfare
Institute v. Kreps,
100 the court held that members of the plaintiff
organization had standing to challenge a waiver of the moratorium
on marine mammal importation under the Marine Mammal
Protection Act. The court referred to the ability of the members “to
see, photograph, and enjoy Cape fur seals alive in their natural
habitat under conditions in which the animals are not subject to
excessive harvesting, inhumane treatment and slaughter of pups that
are very young and still nursing.”
101
3. Visitors and observers, with a species that is unthreatened and
unendangered. The intermediate cases, and the difficult ones under
current law, arise when there is no argument that the species will
dwindle in number, but when a plaintiff alleges that the difficult
conditions faced by the animal will cause, to the plaintiff, an injury
in fact, defined in “aesthetic” terms. An obvious oddity here is that
the plaintiff is likely to be concerned ethically or morally, not
“aesthetically”—at least if the notion of the “aesthetic” is taken to
refer to judgments, not ethical or moral in character, about beauty or
ugliness. Nonetheless, it is the aesthetic injury that is the basis for
the suit.
The leading case is Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Glickman,
102 in
which an en banc panel for the D.C. Circuit was sharply divided. In
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that case, Marc Jurnove, an employee and volunteer for animal relief
and rescue organizations, complained about what he believed to be
the unlawful treatment of many animals at the Long Island Game
Farm Park and Zoo. Jurnave contended that he had visited the park
at least nine times between May 1995 and June 1996, and that the
unlawful and inhumane treatment caused “injury to this aesthetic
interest in observing animals living under humane conditions.”
103
Thus Jurnave did not urge that he had special interest in the decent
treatment of animals by virtue of his service as employee and
volunteer for animal relief and rescue organizations. What mattered
was that he was a visitor to the zoo.
The court held that the aesthetic interest counted as an injury in
fact and that Jurnove had “far more” than an abstract interest in law
enforcement in its own sake.
104 In the court’s view, Jurnove
established an aesthetic interest that he had repeatedly attempted to
promote by “visiting a particular animal exhibition to observe
particular animals there.”
105 Thus the court concluded that an injury
in fact could be established “to a plaintiff’s interest in the quality and
condition of an environmental area that he used.”
106 The court also
concluded that Jurnave could satisfy the two causation requirements.
The current USDA regulations allegedly permitted the conditions of
which Jurnave complained; thus the injury was due to the
government’s action. Standing would be found for “plaintiffs who
claimed aesthetic injury . . . based on the government’s failure to
adequately regulate a third party.”
107 In addition, the injury would be
redressed by a decree in Jurnave’s favor, for “more stringent
regulations . . . would necessarily alleviate [his] aesthetic injury
during his planned, future trips to the Game Farm.”
108
The dissenting judges contended that none of the Article III
requirements had been met. They contended that for those
complaining of an injury to the aesthetic interest in observing
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animals, standing was limited to “diminution-of-the-species.”
109 By
itself aesthetic injury, “a matter of individual taste,” could not justify
standing.
110 “Aesthetic injury,” thus understood, was no different
from the interest in law enforcement of its own sake. In their view,
Jurnave’s claim would allow standing for those seeking to view
“animals in any manner that does not comport with” the plaintiff’s
“individual taste.” Thus “a sadist with an interest in seeing animals
kept under inhumane conditions” would have standing to contest the
inhumane treatment.
111 In other words, this was a purely “subjective”
interest, not a legally cognizable one.
The dissenters urged as well that Jurnave could not show
sufficient causation. The inhumane treatment was not caused by
government; it was caused by the zoo. Thus the dissenters found it
“frightening at a constitutional level” to suggest “that the
government causes everything that it does not prevent.”
112 A judicial
order invalidating the regulation and directing the USDA to
promulgate a new regulation would mandate new conditions at parks
and zoos, but “it would require sheer speculation to presume that any
enrichment devices specified in a future regulation would satisfy
Jurnove’s aesthetic tastes.”
113 Thus it was far too conjectural to
connect the decree sought to protection of the interests invoked by
Jurnove.
If the goal is simply to describe current law, the majority view
seems correct. In Japan Whaling, and in cases that follow it, courts
did not say that an “injury in fact” would exist if and only if the
action at issue would diminish the number of members of the species
at issue. Nor is it clear why “diminution of the species” should count
as an injury in fact and harms of the sort invoked by Jurnove should
not. If the question is whether the plaintiff has suffered an “injury,”
why are the two different? At the same time, there are serious
problems in the majority’s analysis, a point to which I will return
below.
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D. Evaluation
1. Injuries without injuries? As noted, those without an “injury in
fact” are not entitled to bring suit. But what is an “injury in fact”? In
the environmental area, it is well known that people are willing to
pay a certain amount, sometimes a very large amount, to ensure the
“existence” of endangered species. The United States government
takes account of “existence value” in calculating the costs and
benefits of certain courses of action.
114 If someone is willing to pay
for the existence of some animal or set of animals, in what sense is
that person not “injured” when the animal is killed?
I do not mean to suggest that this question cannot be answered.
Perhaps it could be said that someone who is willing to pay for some
state of affairs wants that state of affairs to exist, but that the injury
that comes from the disfavored state of affairs is not something that
the legal system should, or constitutionally may, treat as an injury “in
fact.”
115 On the conventional understanding, this person is interested
in law enforcement for its own sake, or in a state of affairs that he
supports for merely ideological reasons. What is important for
present purposes is to recognize that the legal system is denying that
people suffer injury “in fact” for reasons that involve not “facts” but
judgments about what facts, and what harms, ought to count for
legal purposes. I will return to this point below.
2. Morals and aesthetics. The Animal Legal Defense Fund case
raises fresh questions about the nature of the “injury in fact”
requirement. Many people wish to see animals; many people wish to
see animals treated in certain ways. Do all such people always have
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standing, when their wishes are violated? One puzzle of the court’s
holding is that it seems to offer an affirmative answer to this
question. Another puzzle is that the real objection of the relevant
plaintiffs seems ethical or moral, not aesthetic. And a final puzzle is
the court’s suggestion that Jurnave, unlike a sadist, has standing
because his interest is “legally protected”: “[N]ot every aesthetic
interest can form the basis for a lawsuit; our injury-in-fact test
protects only those aesthetic interests that have been ‘legally
protected.’”
116 Let us attempt to sort out these puzzles.
Of course people do not have standing whenever they have an
“aesthetic injury”—if this term refers to a subjective perception of
disgust or distaste or offense. The requirement of “injury in fact” is
designed to bar suits based on perceptions of this sort. People in
California might well feel disgust or distaste or offense if they hear
of racial discrimination, or a commercial development, on Long
Island; but this does not give them standing. Under current law, it is
necessary for them to be victims of discrimination, or materially
affected by it. If their complaint involves commercial development,
they must visit the relevant area. But this point raises a genuine
problem about the conception of “injury in fact.” Surely the Animal
Legal Defense Fund dissenters are correct to doubt whether a sadist
would have standing to contest regulations that make conditions
more humane for animals—even though there is no doubting that a
case can be imagined in which the sadist suffers no less, “in fact,”
than Jurnave. This point leaves the court’s decision open to the
objection that it really depends on sympathy for Jurnave on the
merits. But something else is at work. Recall that the court’s answer
is that any injury in fact must be “legally cognizable”; it objects that
the sadist would have no legally cognizable interest. To this the
dissenting opinion, naturally enough, objects that the response
confuses the “injury in fact” inquiry with an inquiry whether the
plaintiff is arguably within the zone of protected interests.
The objection is correct, but it does not count against the court’s
decision. There is no way to inquire into “injury in fact” without
making inquiries into law as well. People suffer injuries “in fact”
every day, not least aesthetic injuries, and these injuries do not
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provide the basis for a suit in federal court.
117 The question is
whether some source of law recognizes those injuries. Before the
enactment of the Animal Welfare Act, a person who complained of
mistreatment of animals in a zoo would have no cognizable injury,
no interest protected by law. After the enactment of the Animal
Welfare Act, such mistreatment may well be unlawful, and someone
who complains about it will count as a proper plaintiff if he can show
a particular interest in its prevention. Jurnave certainly was able to
show this interest. The case would be different if a plaintiff never
visited the animals at all, not because such a nonvisitor would have
no injury at all, but because Congress has not given members of the
general public a right to bring suit to ensure law enforcement. A
possible objection would be that Congress conferred no cause of
action on Jurnave. But under the APA as it has come to be
understood, someone who suffers a material injury is permitted to
bring suit so long as he is within the zone of protected interests and
stands apart from members of the general public. Of course
Congress can deny standing to such people if it chooses to do so.
The basic conclusions are therefore as follows. If Congress seeks
to give standing to people to protect interests relating to the well-
being of animals, it must comply with the injury-in-fact
requirement. That requirement is met if a person has a
nonspeculative plan to visit, study, or see the animals in question.
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the same conclusion
follows, with two qualifications: Plaintiffs must show that they fall
within the zone of interests protected by the Act, and they must also
show that in terms of their interests and concerns, they are different
from citizens generally.
3.  Redressability. The issue of redressability raises further
puzzles. On the authority of Japan Whaling, it seems generally
agreed that those who fear the loss of an animal or of animals may
bring suit to prevent governmental action that threatens to create the
loss. But there is some tension in the cases, particularly because the
Japan Whaling Court did not deal with the redressability problem,
which, to get slightly ahead of the story, seems quite severe: How,
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exactly, would a decree in favor of the American Cetacean Society
benefit its members?
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court did not
merely hold that those without a particular plan to see or visit
members of an endangered species lacked standing. A plurality also
said that the redressability requirements were not met, for even if
there was such a plan, the injury was not a result of the government’s
action, nor would it be redressed by a decree on the plaintiffs’
behalf.
118 For example, the United States was funding under 10% of
the disputed development project; if the United States withdrew
funding, would there be any effect on the species that the plaintiffs
sought to preserve? “Respondents have provided nothing to indicate
that the projects they have named will either be suspended, or do less
harm to the listed species, if that fraction is eliminated.”
119 In
addition, the Court noted that the defendant was the Secretary of
the Interior, not the relevant funding agencies. It was not clear that
the funding agencies were funding, in law or in fact, by the decision
of the Secretary, even if he concluded that the EDA applied
extraterritorially.
On this count, the plurality view in Defenders of Wildlife is in
conspicuous tension with the majority view in both Akins and Japan
Whaling, where it was also contended that a decree in the plaintiffs’
favor would not redress their injury. How do these cases bear on the
redressability issue when human beings are attempting to guard
against harms to animals?
Consider first cases in which people seek to observe a species
whose numbers will allegedly be reduced as a result of government
action. This was the situation in Japan Whaling, where the Court
stated, in its footnote discussion, that continued whale harvesting
would impair the members’ interest in whale watching and studying.
This was a statement about injury in fact; the Court did not discuss
the redressability problems. Now it seems clear that if the action
under review would result in the elimination or near-elimination of
whales, the redressability requirements would be met. But there were
several problems in the case. First, a decision to “certify” Japan would
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not necessarily result in compliance, by Japan, with international
conventions with respect to the killing of whales. Perhaps the only
consequence would be that Japan would face sanctions from the
Secretary of State. Second, it is not at all clear that compliance with
Japan would have any material consequences for any member of the
American Cetacean Society. Even if fewer whales were killed, how,
concretely, would that redress the members’ injury. In short, the
difficulty here is that the reduced number of total whales will not
necessarily cause any harm to the plaintiff; for this reason, there is a
possible objection to standing on grounds of both redressability and
injury in fact.
These problems suggest that in order to know whether the
causation requirements are met, it is necessary to know how to
characterize the relevant injury. If the injury is characterized as an
adverse effect on the desire to see a particular whales at particular
times, the plaintiffs will have a very difficult time in establishing
standing. But if the injury is characterized as an increased probability
of one kind or another, the causation requirements are plainly met.
Japan Whaling must be understood as holding that the decreased
availability of whales is itself a legally cognizable injury, and also that
the increased likelihood of decreased availability, brought about by
the failure to certify Japan, counts as a legally cognizable injury. This
holding, to be defensible as such, must depend on some kind of
characterization of the injury that the underlying source of law is
designed to prevent.
Compare, for example, the Court’s decision that white
construction contractors had standing to challenge a racial set aside
program, even though they could not show that they would have
received a contract without the program; the equal protection clause
protects the opportunity to compete on equal terms, and that injury
would be redressed by a decree in the plaintiffs’ favor.
120 Similarly,
the cases recognizing standing for competitors must be taken to have
held that the redressability requirements were, not because any
particular plaintiff would necessarily have benefited materially, but
because the injury consists of the inability to compete on the terms
prescribed by Congress. From these points we can see the weakness
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in the plurality’s view on the redressability issue in Defenders of
Wildlife. The plaintiffs were complaining, not that particular species
members would die, but that there was an increased risk of death as
a result of the unlawful use of federal funds to sponsor the relevant
program. If the plaintiffs were correct on the law—and that was an
issue for the merits—the statute was designed to prevent American
funds from being used in programs that might result in the death of
members of an endangered species. The injury, so characterized,
would have been redressed by a decree in their favor.
Two conclusions follow. First, competitors who suffer “injury in
fact” need not worry about the redressability requirements. Second,
plaintiffs claiming “aesthetic” injuries will probably have standing if
they are complaining about the government’s failure to issue or
enforce regulations that, if issued or enforced, would eliminate those
injuries.
4. Competitors within the zone? The thrust of the discussion thus
far has been that the standing question should be focussed on
legislative instructions. Injuries qualify as such if a statute qualifies
them as such; whether an injury is redressable depends on how it is
characterized, and the best way to characterize it is to examine the
relevant source of law. But all this does raise a puzzle for at least
some competitors. Perhaps some statutes protecting animal rights or
welfare are enacted in part because of their beneficial effects for
competitors; but others are designed to protect animals, and have
nothing to do with competitors at all, whose economic advantage is
entirely incidental. This point suggests that an inspection of some
statutes will show that competitors are not even arguably within the
zone.
121 The best response would point to the fact that competitive
advantages, for those who comply with the relevant laws, are a
means to the end sought by the statute. In most cases, this response
should be sufficient, though reasonable people will differ in assessing
statutes that are usually unclear on the point.
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E. Summary
The discussion is best summarized with a set of stylized cases.
1. A group of citizens concerned about animal suffering or
about threats to the continued existence of a species challenge
government action that, on their view, leads to unlawful harm to
animals. On the facts as stated, no standing is available, even if
Congress has conferred a cause of action on “any person.” The
reason is that there is no injury in fact.
2. Same as case 1, but the group alleges that it has members
who wish to see, enjoy, or study the relevant animals. No standing is
available, even if Congress has conferred a cause of action of “any
person,” because on the facts as stated, no member has a sufficiently
concrete plan in mind, and hence there is no injury in fact.
3. A group of citizens seeks information bearing on the
treatment of animals under the Animal Welfare Act; the group
contends that the information must be both compiled and disclosed.
If Congress has granted a cause of action to “any person,” standing is
available. If Congress has not conferred such a cause of action,
standing is unavailable—unless the group can establish that it has a
special interest in the information that distinguishes it from citizens
generally and that it is within the zone of interests protected by the
statute.
4. Someone who regularly visits a zoo challenges violations of
the Animal Welfare Act at that zoo. Standing is available if
Congress has conferred a cause of action on “any person.” The case is
somewhat more difficult without such a special grant of standing,
but the suit should be justiciable in that case as well, because the
injury in fact test is met, because the plaintiff is within the zone of
protected interests, and because the plaintiff has an interest that
distinguishes him from members of the public as a whole.
5. Company A, a producer of certain medicines challenges
commercial practices by Company B; company A contends that the
practices of Company B are violative of the Animal Welfare Act and
led to the production of medicines that serve as competition for
Company A’s products. Standing is probably available, because
Company A suffers an injury in fact, and because Company A is at
least arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute in
question.Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 28
III. Do Animals Have Standing?
A. A Simmering Dispute With A Simple Answer
Do animals have standing? Several cases so suggest. In Palila v.
Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources,
122 the court said that
“[a]s an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act, . . .
the bird (Loxioodes bailleui), a member of the Hawaiian honey-
creeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into federal
court as a plaintiff in its own right.”
123 In a remarkably large number
of cases in the federal reports, animals appear as named plaintiffs.
124
But some courts have held that animals cannot bring suit in their
own name.
125 Of course any animals who are entitled to bring suit in
this way would be represented by counsel, who would owe guardian-
like obligations and make decisions, subject to those obligations, on
their clients’ behalf. But this type of proceeding is hardly foreign to
our law; consider suits brough on behalf of children or corporations.
From the discussion thus far, it should be clear that the question
whether animals have standing depends on the content of positive
law. If Congress has not given standing to animals, the issue is at an
end. Generally, of course, Congress grants standing to “persons,” as
it does under the general standing provision of the APA,
126 the
Marine Mammal Protection Act,
127 and the Endangered Species
Act.”
128 Indeed I have not been able to find any federal statute that
allows animals to sue in their own name. As a rule, the question is
therefore quite clear: Animals lack standing as such, simply because
no relevant statute confers a cause of action on animals.
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B. The Question of Legislative Power
It seems possible, however, that before long, Congress will grant
standing to animals to protect their own rights and interests.
Congress might do this in the belief that in some contexts, it will be
hard to find any person with an injury in fact to bring suit in his own
name. Consider, for example, a proposed statutory ban on the
importation of goods made with dog or cat fur
129—a statutory ban
that if disregarded, might not be easily enforceable by human beings.
And even if statutes protecting animal welfare might be enforceable
by human beings, Congress might grant standing to animals in their
own right, partly to make a public statement about whose interests
are most directly at stake,
130 partly to increase the number of private
monitors of illegality, and partly to bypass complex inquiries into
whether prospective human plaintiffs have injuries in fact.
Suppose that Congress does grant a cause of action to animals
directly, to allow them to prevent actions harmful to their interests,
such as extinction or suffering. Is there anything problematic in this
course of action? The only serious question is constitutional in
nature: whether the grant of standing would violate Article III’s
requirement of a “case or controversy.”
131 Perhaps it could be argued
that Congress could not constitutionally confer standing on animals.
On this view, the modern understanding of what qualifies as a “case
or controversy” should be based on an inquiry into what the
founding generation understood to count as such. To say the least,
the founding generation did not anticipate that dogs or chimpanzees
could bring suit in their own name. Ideas of this kind have been used
to limit the class of disputes that Congress can place in an Article III
court
132; perhaps they could be used to forbid Congress from giving
standing to animals.
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A central problem with this objection is that Congress is
frequently permitted to create juridical persons, and to allow them to
bring suit in their own right. Corporations are the most obvious
example. But legal rights are also given to trusts, municipalities,
partnerships, and even ships.
133 In an era in which slaves were not
“persons,” it was acceptable to allow actions to be brought on behalf
of slaves. In the same way, Congress might say that animals at risk of
injury or mistreatment have a right to bring suit in their own name.
Nothing in the requirement of a “case or controversy” should be read
to forbid Congress from treating animals as owners of legal rights.
The “case or controversy” requires means that courts may not hear
cases in which there is no cause of action, and it imposes other
limitations on judicial power, including, under current doctrine,
prohibitions on mootness, political questions, and merely ideological
claims. To be sure, the framers anticipated that plaintiffs would
ordinarily be human beings. But nothing in the Constitution limits
Congress’ power to give standing to others. The conclusion is that if
Congress wants to give animals standing to bring suit to protect their
legal interests, it is permitted to do so.
IV. Implications and Speculations
This is not the place for a general treatment of the law of
standing of the question of “animal rights.” But the discussion does
bear on those issues, and it may therefore be useful to offer a few
brief speculations here.
A. Standing and the Problem of Injury in Fact
The area of standing to protect animals suggests (yet again) the
extreme awkwardness of continuing to proceed as if “injury in fact” is
a necessary or sufficient condition for standing.
134 Many people have
injuries “in fact” in connection with the suffering of others, human
or nonhuman, but they do not have standing for that reason. If Jones
sees an act of abuse directed against a child, a friend, or a horse, he
may well suffer injury, indeed he may well be willing to pay a great
deal to avoid that injury; but by virtue of that injury, he is not
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entitled to bring suit in federal court. Some source of law must make
that injury legally cognizable. In the three sorts of cases I have
discussed—informational, competitive, and aesthetic injury—
standing exists to the extent that it makes sense to interpret the
relevant source of law as giving particular persons a right to bring
suit. The most important point to recognize is that Congress has
control over that question.
The second most important point to recognize is a corollary:
When the cases seem hard, it is because it is not clear, from those
statutes that have been enacted, whether the plaintiff has been given
a right to bring suit. Hence the information cases are easiest when
Congress has spoken unambiguously on the question. Competitor
standing is generally easy too, for the Court has suggested that when
a competitor is injured “in fact,” it should be assumed that Congress
sought to prevent that injury. The aesthetic injury cases are harder if
it is unclear whether, in enacting the statutes protecting animal
welfare, Congress should be taken to have granted a private cause of
action to people who are distressed by seeing mistreated animals. It
is for this reason that the two Animal Legal Defense Fund cases
could have gone the other way; the real dispute involved the best
reading of the underlying statute. It is important to recognize these
points partly because they clarify a topic that is otherwise quite
confusing, partly because they make it possible to see what
reasonable people might be disagreeing about, and above all because
they place control of the standing question in the hands of the
democratic process, which is where it belongs.
B. Disaggregating Animal Rights
What about the question of “animal rights”
135? Many people
reject the idea that animals can have “rights,” often on the theory
that rights belong along to those with certain cognitive capacities,
limited to human beings. Some people think that it is important to
say that animals lack “rights” even if people have duties to animals.
Without answering the largest questions about the nature of rights,
we might suggest that for certain purposes, at least, it is most useful
                                                
135 See James Rachels, Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of
Darwinism (1990).Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 32
to treat “rights” as legally enforceable claims of one kind or another.
If rights are understood in this mundane and pragmatic way, there is
nothing novel or unfamilar about the notion of animal rights.
Indeed, animals have long had a wide range of “rights” against
cruelty and mistreatment under state law, and these rights have
recently been growing in both state and national legislatures.
For purposes of knowing whether animals “have rights,” it is not
sufficient to know whether animals are able to vindicate these rights
in their own name. Many of the most familiar and celebrated of
human rights are enforceable only by public authorities. We have
seen that mere neglect of animal welfare counts as a criminal
violation, and people are under an affirmative obligation to expend
resources for the care and protection of animals. In many states, a
failure to feed or shelter an animal can amount to, in practice, to a
violation of an animal’s rights; the Animal Welfare Act creates
national rights to food, shelter, even adequate ventilation and
medical care. Indeed, animals have, under current law, a remarkable
set of legal entitlements, including property rights of various sorts,
136
and they enjoy these rights against their “owners.” The reason that
the relevant rights do not matter in the world—to the extent that
they do not—is that little enforcement activity is directed against
violations. The real question, and the question on which much
future debate is inevitable, is the extent and dimension of animal
rights, not their existence.
In an instructive discussion of the general problem Gary
Francione makes a sharp distinction between “animal welfare” and
“animal rights.” He contends that American law is committed to
preventing infliction of “unnecessary” pain on animals and to
ensuring that animals are treated “humanely.”
137 This commitment
results in a form of balancing in which animals, generally treated as
mere property, end up losing whenever human interests can be found
on the other side. “To label something property, is, for all intents
and purposes, to conclude that the entity so labeled possesses no
interests that merit protection and that the entity is solely a means to
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the end determined by the property owner.”
138 Francione seeks to
replace “legal welfarism” with a system of animal rights, in which
ultimately animals are regarded as having “inherent worth and value”
and are not treated as property at all.
Much of what Francione argues seems convincing. Often
animals have been regarded as means to human ends, and often the
status of animals as mere property has helped to ensure this unjust
state of affairs. Of course animals should not be treated as mere
means to human ends, if only because they are capable of suffering,
and in any case both state and federal law are firmly committed
against the notion of animals as mere means. But there is nothing
magical in the notions of “animal welfare” and “animal rights”; what
matters is not the abstractions but the concrete meanings given to
them. It is possible to imagine a regime of animal “rights” in which
the permissible justifications for intrusions are so numerous, and so
undemanding, that animals are hardly protected at all. It is possible
to imagine a regime of animal “welfare” in which the interest in
avoiding pain and suffering is taken extremely seriously, so much so
that it overcomes many significant human interests. In fact it is
reasonable to think that all or most legal rights qualify as such
because of their beneficial effects on welfare, however understood;
on this view, legal rights are instrumental to well-being, suitably
defined.
139 Francione seems wrong to contrast “welfare” and “rights”
so sharply.
What about the notion of animals as property? Here the stakes
are a mixture of substantive and rhetorical. If the status of property
means the status of means to the ends of others, or a status of human
domination and control, animals should not have the status of
property. But even inanimate objects are protected against
domination and control; you may not burn down your house, and if
you have certain kinds of property, you are prevented from
destroying it. Animals currently count as property, but on the law as
it is on the books, they are nonetheless protected against a wide
range of injuries. We can imagine a situation in which animals are
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“owned” but in which the right of ownership does not include rights
to inflict suffering; indeed that is not far from the law as it now
stands. But the rhetoric may matter. In the long term it may well
make sense to think of animals as something other than property,
partly in order to clarify their status as beings with rights of their
own.
140
Let me conclude, however, with a more modest suggestion. A
serious problem under the principal national protection against
animal suffering—the AWA—is that the Department of Agriculture
lacks sufficient resources to enforce it adequately. At a minimum, the
Act should be amended so as to create a private cause of action by
affected persons and animals, to bring suit against facilities that are
operating in violation of the Act. A serious problem with current
animal welfare statutes, including the AWA, is an absence of
sufficient enforcement activity, a problem that stems at least partly
from limited federal resources. At least when a violation of the
statute is unambiguous, private parties should be permitted to bring
suit directly against violators. This system of dual public and private
enforcement would track the pattern under many federal
environmental statutes; there is no reason that it should not be
followed for statutes protecting animal welfare.
V. Conclusion
There is nothing new or unfamiliar in the idea of animal rights.
In the last thirty years, protection of animal “rights”—in the form of
protection of animal welfare—has become an unmistakable part of
federal law. The serious issues are ones of definition (what kinds of
rights do animals have?) and of enforcement (who is entitled to
enforce existing rights and duties?).
My principal topic here has involved that aspect of enforcement
that comes under the rubric of standing. The conclusions for which I
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have argued are best divided into two categories—when Congress
has power to confer standing, through explicit statement, and when
standing exists under existing law. We have seen that Congress can
give people standing to bring suit to obtain information bearing on
the treatment of animals. Congress can also give people standing to
bring suit to vindicate aesthetic interests in ensuring the humane
treatment of animals, so long as such people have an actual plan to
see the relevant animals. Congress can give people standing to bring
suit to prevent an increased likelihood that members of certain
species will decrease in number, so long as such people have an
imminent, nonspeculative plan to see or study the relevant animals.
Finally, Congress has the authority to grant animals standing to
protect their interests, in the sense that injured animals might be
counted as juridical persons, to be protected by human plaintiffs
initiating proceedings on their behalf.
Under the APA as it now stands, a person has standing to
obtain information involving the well-being of animals, unless the
statute gives rise to a contrary inference or the plaintiff cannot
distinguish his interest from that of the public at large. Under the
APA, a person has standing to protect animals that she likes to see
or to study, if the action at issue threatens to diminish the
population of the relevant species. The principal qualification to this
claim is that the law has a degree of uncertainty with respect to when
the relevant injury will be attributed to the government’s conduct.
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Under the APA, a person has standing to protect animals that she
likes to see or study, if the plaintiff has an imminent and not merely
speculative plan to see or study the relevant animals.
Under existing statutes, animals do not have standing as such to
protect their own interests. But Congress is entitled to grant them
standing if it chooses to do so. Building on these claims, I have
suggested that Congress should grant a private cause of action, to
injured persons and to animals themselves, to prevent practices that
are already unlawful. Legislative decisions on such questions will
have considerable symbolic importance. But they will not be only
symbolic, for they will help define the real-world meaning of
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statutory texts that attempt to protect animal welfare—statutes that
now promise a great deal but deliver far too little.37 Standing for Animals
Appendix: Major Federal Statutes Protecting Animals
Endangered Species Act, 16 USC 1531-1543
Animal Welfare Act, 7 USC 2131-2159
Humane Slaughter Act, 7 USC 1901-1906
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 USC 1361-1407
Airborne Hunting Act, 16 USC 742j-1
Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 USC 1331-1340
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 USC 1385
Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 USC 668-668dChicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 38
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